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Abstract. In this paper we present and confront the expected outcome of a raise in earnings 
taxes on the regional or sectoral allocation of labor force and employment. The basic 
frameworks are the benchmark dualistic scenarios. A single-input analysis of an 
homogeneous product economy is provided once extensions were designed to highlight 
the role of mobility barriers and how they interact with local wage-setting rules to 
determine regional allocation rather than trade issues or factor substitution. We report the 
main effects on equilibrium local after-tax wages, supply, employment and aggregate 
welfare surplus of a unilateral as well as a simultaneous unit tax increase of the (a) basic 
two-sector model in six different scenarios: free market; partial (one-sector) coverage with 
perfect intersector mobility; partial (one-sector) coverage with imperfect mobility (Harris-
Todaro); multiple (two-sector) coverage with imperfect mobility (Bhagwati-Hamada); 
partial (one-sector) coverage with affiliation restrictions in the covered sector; partial (one-
sector) coverage with limited employment generation ability in the traditional uncovered 
sector. Needless to say, the results would apply to any other production factor, one or other 
scenario being more appropriate for inference of the consequences of differential taxation 
systems. 
Keywords. Taxation and migration, Taxation and mobility, Taxation and segmented labor 
markets, Regional labor markets, Fiscal federalism. 
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1. Introduction 
he aim of this research is to contrast the expected long-run impact of 
taxation on labor force flows under alternative scenarios, 
highlighting the interplay of three environment features: institutional 
wage setting, barriers to mobility, and differential tax treatment across 
regions. 
The subject is of interest to international factor mobility analysis, where 
income tax treatment of foreign residents and their consequences has 
deserved considerable debate (Bhagwati, 1982). In this area, skill 
distribution biases seem to be of major concern (See Bhagwati & Hamada, 
1982, for example ), as well as potential evasion – either legally, through 
emigration, or illegally through fraud. 
At the national affairs level, fiscal federalism faces the same mechanisms 
on the revenue generation side. However, going over the literature (Oates, 
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1999) provides a recent survey. Musgrave & Musgrave (1976), Atkinson & 
Stiglitz (1980), Tresch (1981) all contain fiscal federalism sections), it more 
frequently aims at redistribution issues, or the optimal level of local 
expenditures (in the tradition of the Tiebout (1956) insights). Optimal local 
taxation has, of course, been addressed (see Mieszkowski & Zodrow (1989) 
for an appraisal) – sometimes oriented towards exploring the existence 
and/or consequences of decentralization (after Gordon’s (1983) good 
starting point), but generally assuming an underlying competitive labor or 
factor market. 
Our goal was to expose the potential distortionary effects of 
differentiated labor income taxation schemes under different assumptions 
of mobility across regions, jurisdictions, or productive sectors, and to 
recognize that if compounded with non-competitive restrictions – 
unionisation, for example – it may imply quite unexpected efficient or 
second-best recommendations. 
We focus on the impact of taxation working through potential labor 
flows – of taxpayers “voting with their feet” – and employment allocation. 
Redistribution of the revenue levied on the local population is 
superimposed – but, as a lump-sum, not affecting workers response, 
potentially arising from a general public good provided to both regions’ 
consumers in an uniform manner. Under such assumptions, one could 
predict that a local earnings factor tax would have similar effects to an 
institutional wage floor; and such conclusion is traditionally cited in the 
general equilibrium two factor-two sector analysis textbook example 
(Layard & Walters (1978), section 3-5 and exercise Q3-10; Bosworth, 
Dawkins & Stromback (1996), section 10.3.2. Also, Johnson & Mieszkowski 
(1970)). As we will see, under different mobility assumptions, that is not at 
all the case. Complementarily, we compute the expected total welfare 
changes implied by the different fiscal environments - local assessments in 
these matters are difficult to disentangle, once (as noted) after a fiscal 
change individuals’ affiliation also change. 
The basic structures chosen to replicate the effects of taxation were 
simple dualistic models in the tradition of Harris (1969) and Harris-Todaro 
(1970) rural-urban migration analysis (a good survey of theoretical 
literature can be found in Bhattacharya (1993)). The principles behind its 
workings became widespread in the study of labor market regional as also 
sector – occupation, profession – allocation (see McNabb & Ryan (1990) for 
a survey of segmented labor markets. See also Saint-Paul (1996) for 
applications of the theory with microfoundations for several dualistic 
structures.) and under minimum or other wage legislation or restrictions 
(see, for example, Mincer (1976), McDonald & Solow (1985) and Fields 
(1989). Also Brown, Gilroy & Kohen (1982)). We follow the cases contrasted 
in Martins (1996), inspecting the consequences of introducing a local unit 
tax 2 on employment in each of the scenarios.  
 
2 Proportional earnings taxes would generate similar qualitative outcomes. 
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Total – national, worldwide according to context we may wish to 
simulate - labor force supply is assumed perfectly inelastic. The hypothesis 
was thought convenient once it neutralizes the welfare tax – the 
“deadweight” - loss under a uniform tax system.  
Also, neither workers – that chose location, or sector affiliation, 
maximizing the expected after-tax wage - nor unions – setting net wages - 
possess any “tax illusion”. 
After notation is briefly settled in section I, we depart from the 
benchmark case - free market with perfect mobility across regions or 
sectors -, outlined in section II. In section III, partial coverage with perfect 
mobility - i.e., people not employed in the primary sector can immediately 
get a job in the secondary sector and wait there for an opportunity to 
switch, and thus, there is (again) no unemployment generation - is 
introduced. In section IV, a version of the Harris-Todaro model - with 
imperfect mobility and institutionally fixed wage in one of the sectors - is 
inspected. In section V, the Bhagwati-Hamada economy – with two 
covered sectors - is forwarded. Section VI deals with frameworks where 
there are size restrictions: in the primary sector size - the counterpart of the 
H.-T. model; and in the employment generation capacity of the secondary 
sector - the "dual" case of the B.-H. model. The exposition ends with a brief 
summary in section VII.  
 
2. Notation 
There are two sectors - or two regions - and a fixed exogenous labor 
supply, L
_
. This total labor supply decides whether to locate in region (or 
affiliate to sector) 1 or 2. Denote by L
_









        (1) 
 
An inelastic supply in single-sector models is known to generate no 
deadweight loss. The assumption is thus useful to assess tax implications 
with respect to the reallocation of resources in dualistic frameworks – 
potentially implying welfare losses that would not arise with uniformity 
and total mobility. 
In sector i, the aggregate demand function is given by: 
 
Li  =  L
i
(Wi)    ,   i = 1, 2        (2) 
 




(Wi)/dWi  0 – is always 
assumed. Denote the corresponding inverse demand function by: 
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Wi  =  W
i
(Li)    ,   i = 1, 2       (3) 
 
There are no cross effects, i.e., dL
i
/dWj = 0 for ij. The wage elasticity of 
demand of sector i at a particular point of labor demand will be denoted by 
 






(Li)' Li].    (4) 
 
The background technology and preferences in the economy are 
anything but complex: an homogeneous good is produced and consumed 
in both regions. Identical workers as “land-owners” consume directly what 
they produce or receive as income: there is no (reason to) trade, nor (need 
for) money. Also, there is no inter-regional (sectoral) imbalance in terms of 
affiliation preferences: all the individuals value is income and the regions 
do not differentiate otherwise by any intrinsic characteristics. 
We will assume further through sections II to V a subset of the 
following: 
1. individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected (after-tax) income. 
2. there is no fiscal (tax) illusion and institutional wages are set in net 
terms. 
3.a. there is perfect mobility across sectors alternatively: 
3.b. job rotation is only accomplished locally or within the industry. 
4.a. wage in sector 1 is determined by market conditions; alternatively: 
4.b. wage in sector 1 is institutionally determined. 
5.a. wage in sector 2 is market determined; alternatively:  
5.b. wage in sector 2 is institutionally determined. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 insure that comparative statics may be adequately 
performed for a model – equilibrium conditions - set in reference to net or 
after-tax wages and are always superimposed. For simplicity, assume a 
unit tax Ti per unit of employment is levied on sector i. Then, labor 
demands can be expressed as: 
 
Li  =  L
i
(Wi + Ti)    ;    and    Wi  =  W
i
(Li) - Ti   ,  i = 1, 2   (5) 
 
where Wi is the after-tax wage. One might argue that the assumptions 
ignore the possibility of higher taxes being re-collected in the form of 
higher local public expenditures; then, a raise in the local tax could have 
similar effects to that of a local minimum wage. We adopt those 
assumptions to measure the effect of a distortionary tax under “non-
distortionary” expenditures: say, the whole economy’s fiscal revenue is 
evenly distributed by the total labor force. (Or they can chose in which 
region to spend vacations - reside - and consume the local public good). 
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They will be appropriate if we are inspecting industry-specific rather than 
regional labor force flows.  
In another angle, a tax on one region’s employment – specially in an 
uncovered region – is expected to have the same effect as a negative 
relative local public expenditure disadvantage – say, the region requires 
higher or more expensive infrastructure to maintain its equal appeal to the 
other. Or a negative effect due to relative location intrinsic cost of living – a 
requirement of more expensive heating/housing costs due to climatic 
reasons – or appeal; on a sector’s employment, of a relative worker distaste 
for industry affiliation – say, a compensating differential is required for a 
riskier profession. These imbalances would generate – and provide a 
rationale for - a persistent or long-run equilibrium differential of expected 
wages – even if not of expected individual welfare - across sectors or 
regions in favor of one of the areas in the absence of government 
intervention. The models’ mechanics would not be much altered if we 
added an exogenous differential “a” to the expected wages of the favored 
region in the equilibrium conditions below. One should keep in mind that 
such a differential would not create the need for intervention under a 
complete mobility assumption – maximization of total welfare (including 
the externality “consumption” by residents of the favored region) would be 
guaranteed by a competitive market equilibrium dynamics. 
Assumptions 3 to 5 characterize the mobility environment. Different 
combinations of alternatives a and b generate backgrounds of benchmark 
dualistic models that we shall stage. For instance, 3.a. insures that there will 
be no unemployment in the economy – provided that the wage is market 
determined in at least one of the sectors. 
In the presence of one sector only and inelastic supply, a tax has no 
aggregate welfare consequences – of course, under the utilitarian social-
welfare criteria underlying consumer surplus(or economic rent)-based 
analysis -, provided the net wage is free. With institutionally set wages – 
and because supply is inelastic – the welfare – total surplus - change from 
an increase in the tax rate can be approximated in monetary terms by, in 
space (L, W), the area below the (inverse) labor demand schedule between 
the before and after-tax employment levels. If Li(T1, T2) is the equilibrium 
employment in sector i when tax levels are, respectively, T1 and T2 in 














(Lj) dLj      (6) 
 
Then, the effect on sector i of a unitary change in region j’s tax rate can 
be approximated by: 
   i  =  Welfare change in sector i per unit of Tj  =  W
i
(Li) Li(T1, T2)/Tj  
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The total effect in the two areas of the tax levied on sector j would 
naturally add to: 
 
Total Welfare Change per unit of Tj =   
=  W
i
(Li) Li(T1, T2)/Tj  +  W
j
(Lj) Lj(T1, T2)/Tj    (7) 
 
Such expressions simplify in each of the simulated environments. 
We may want to contrast total revenue generation ability of a unitary tax 
raise, using the fact that revenue levied on region j is: 
 
RFj  =  L
j
(Wj + Tj)  Tj        (8) 
and thus: 
RFj/Tj  =  L
j
(Wj + Tj)  +  Tj Lj/Tj            (9) 
 
For simplicity, we will be interested in measuring effects for Tj around 0. 
Then, the welfare change implied by an unitary increase in fiscal revenue 
obtained from region j will be higher the lower is L
j
(Wj + Tj). That is: 
 
Welfare change (total, or in sector i) per unit of RFj =  
[Welfare change (total, or in sector i) per unit of Tj] / [L
j
(Wj + Tj) +  Tj Lj/Tj 
]         (10) 
 
To obtain one extra (a given<) monetary revenue unit, the government 
would extract it by raising the tax rate Tj for which that measure - for the 
total economy - is lower. Under well-behaved second-order conditions and 
existence of interior solutions, an efficient scheme (Ti, Tj) – guaranteeing a 
minimum RFi + RFj  R - would equalize the (total welfare change per unit 
of RFi) to the (total welfare change per unit of RFj). 
 
3. Competitive labor markets under perfect mobility 




i = Li = L
i
(Wi + Ti)  ,   i = 1,2       (11) 
 
In the present scenario, people will move from one to the other sector's 
employment till equalization of net wages. That is, after-tax wage W will 
adjust till W* that solves: 
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(W* + T1) + L
2
(W* + T2)  =  L
_
     or 
W* = W
i
(Li) – Ti = W
j




 - Li) – Tj      (12) 
 
The increase of the tax rate has mainly effects on the regional allocation 
of labor and on the net wage bill. The net wage decreases: 
 
W*/ Ti = - L
i
(W* + Ti)' / [L
1
(W* + T1)' + L
2










=  1 / [1/ L
1
(W*+T1)' + 1/ L
2
(W*+T2)']  <  0    (14) 
 
Given perfect mobility and inelastic supply, there will be no 
unemployment but there will be some “deadweight loss” as long as there is 
some reallocation of labor resources relative to the free market solution: 
 
Welfare Change per unit of Ti =        (15) 
=  W
i
(Li) Li(T1, T2)/Ti  +  W
j
(Lj) Lj(T1, T2)/Ti  = 
=  [W
i
(Li)  -  W
j
(Lj)]  Li(T1, T2)/Ti  =  
=  [W
i
(Li)  -  W
j
(Lj)]  / [1/ L
1
(W*+T1)' + 1/ L
2
(W*+T2)']  = 
=  (Ti  -  Tj) / [1/ L
1
(W*+T1)' + 1/ L
2
(W*+T2)']   
 
Provided Ti > Tj, the welfare effect of the increase in the tax is negative. 
An unilateral rise in Ti will move resources away from region i – and 
farther away from the allocation that maximizes total welfare, occurring 
with either equal tax rates or no tax (see below). If Tj is lower than Ti, 
however, the opposite occurs – then, an unitary increase in the tax rate 
approximates the two tax rates and labor allocation to the efficient 
outcome. 
Let there be a uniform fiscal treatment across regions such that Ti = T. 
Then: 
 
W*/ T  = - 1  <  0       (16) 
 
Any tax rate change is completely passed on to the net wage. This 
implies that a change in the tax rate will have no impact on local 
employment or total welfare. 
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Proposition 1: 1.1. Under free market, the usual dualistic model will result 
in equalization of net wages across regions or sectors and there will be no 
unemployment. 
1.2. Any labor tax rate increase depresses the equilibrium after-tax wage. 
1.3. An unilateral increase in the tax rate will decrease local employment 
and population. It will be welfare enhancing iff the region has lower taxes 
than the neighbour. The induced labor flow will be larger the higher the 
slopes of both local labor demands in absolute value. 
1.4. A uniform tax rate (due to the inelastic total supply assumption) has 
no effect on the regional allocation of the labor force – and hence it is 
compatible with total welfare (product) maximization. 
 
4. Partial coverage - The perfect mobility case 
Assume 3.a, 4.b and 5.a. of section I. The wage in the two sectors differ. 
In sector 1, the net wage is fixed at level W1. As the other sector’s wage is 
free, it will decrease till all the labor force is employed – the equilibrium 




i = Li = L
i




(W1 + T1) + L
2
(W2 + T2)  =  L
_
     or     (18) 






(W1 + T1)]  
 
An increase in the covered sector tax rate will expel local population 
while depressing the uncovered sector’s net wage: 
 
W2/ T1  =  - L
1
(W1 + T1)' / L
2
(W2 + T2)'  <  0    (19) 
L1/T1  =  - L2/T1  =  L
1
(W1 + T1)'  <  0       (20) 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T1 =        (21) 
=  W
1
(L1) L1(T1, T2)/T1  +  W
2
(L2) L2(T1, T2)/T1  = 
=  [W
1
(L1)  -  W
2
(L2)]  L1(T1, T2)/T1  =  
=  [W
1




(W1 + T1)'  =  
=  [(W1 + T1)  -  (W2 + T2)]  L
1
(W1 + T1)'   
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The tax will be welfare improving iff   
 
W1 + T1  <  W2 + T2           (22) 
 
That is possible if gross wages are higher in region 2 (even if net wages 
are there smaller for the minimum wage in sector 1 to be binding). Then, by 
raising taxes in region 1, it will be possible to lower sector’s 2 net wages 
enough to boost employment and generate a welfare rise.  
A tax on the uncovered sector is passed to the local net wage and has no 
allocation effects: 
 
W2/ T2  =  - 1  <  0     ;     Li/ T2  = 0,  i = 1,2.    (23) 
 
Hence, an optimal global policy to raise a given fiscal revenue will start 
by taxing region 1 till (22) holds in equality. Henceforth, if possible, both 
sectors will be taxed preserving it. 




(W1 + T) + L
2
(W2 + T)  =  L
_
       (24) 
W2/ T  =  - [L
1
(W1 + T)' + L
2
(W2 + T)'] / L
2
(W2 + T)'  <  0   (25) 
L1/T  =  - L2/T = L
1
(W1+T)'  <  0      (26) 
 
The implied welfare change will be: 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T  =        (27) 
=  W
1
(L1) L1(T1, T2)/T  +  W
2
(L2) L2(T1, T2)/T  = 
=  [W
1
(L1)  -  W
2
(L2)]  L1(T1, T2)/T  =  
=  [W
1




(W1 + T)'  =  
=  [(W1 + T)  -  (W2 + T)]  L
1
(W1 + T)'  =   
=  (W1 -  W2)  L
1
(W1 + T)'   
 
The tax will never be welfare improving because for a binding minimum 
wage  
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Proposition 2: 2.1. In a dualistic model with perfect mobility and 
institutional wage fixed in one of the sectors, the equilibrium after-tax wage 
in the second sector is lower than the free market after-tax wage. There will 
be no unemployment. 
2.2. An unilateral increase in the tax rate of the institutionally covered 
sector will depress the wage of the other sector, which will see its 
employment increase. It will be welfare improving if and only if the gross 
wage in the covered sector is lower than in the uncovered one. 
2.3. An increase in the tax rate of the uncovered sector will have no 
impact on the regional allocation of the labor force. 
2.4. Under a uniform fiscal system, an increase of the (common) tax rate 
will relocate the labor force, increasing employment in the uncovered 
sector (by the same magnitude as a unilateral increase of the tax rate of the 
uncovered sector would). It will never be welfare improving. 
A final comment can be made. At first glance, we could think that taxes 
would have the same effect as an institutionally set wage. As we see, they 
do not, even in this simple structure – where total supply does not respond 
to wages -, provided that the sector’s net wage is free. And they have 
different implications not due to distributional considerations, which we 
discarded, but due to the generation of different regional or sector 
employment allocation. 
 
5. Partial coverage and imperfect mobility - The Harris-
Todaro Model 
Assume 3.b, 4.b and 5.a. of section I. The wage in the two sectors differ. 
In sector 1, the net wage is fixed at level W1. As the other sector’s wage is 




2  =  L2  =  L
2
(W2 + T2)       (29) 
 
However, to have access to wage W1, people have to locate there, or to 
specialize if we are addressing industry rather than regional affiliation – 
implying that unemployment will be generated in the region. There will be 
labor force flows till 
 
W1  x   Probability of Employment in region 1 = W2   (30) 
 












(W2+T2)]} = W2  (31) 
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(W2+T2)]  =  W2 L
_
 - W2 L
2
(W2+T2)   (32) 
 
Consider a change in the tax rate applied to employment in sector 1. 
Then: 
 






(W2+T2) - W2 L
2
(W2+T2)'] < 0 (33) 
L1/T1 = L
1









(W2+T2) - W2 L
2
(W2+T2)']  >  0 
 









U/T1  =  - L
1
(W1+T1)' {1 + W1 L
2







(W2+T2)']} (> 0 if but not only if W1 is close to W2) 
 
An increase in the covered sector tax rate will necessarily depress the 
uncovered sector’s wage and raise its employment. We note, once again but 
now under the H.-T. scenario, that – because we assume that workers 
respond to after-tax income – the effect does not coincide with the impact 
of an increase in the covered sector’s wage rate 3. 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T1 =         (36) 
=  W
1
(L1) L1(T1, T2)/T1  +  W
2





(W1 + T1)'  +  W
2









(W2+T2) - W2 L
2









(W2 + T2)]  +   
+  [W1 W
2




(W2 + T2)' L
1





(W2 + T2) - W2 L
2
(W2 + T2)']   
 
 
3 For a direct contrast, see Martins (1996) for example. 
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The first term is negative. Yet, the second may be positive. For T1 = T2 = 














(W2 + T2) - W2 L
2
(W2 + 
T2)']  <  0 
 
The effect of the tax on welfare is then unambiguously negative.  
(Interestingly, Srinivasan & Bhagwati (1975), analysing the impact of a 
wage subsidy to the institutional sector on a version of the H-T. model find 
it welfare enhancing. However, their setting differs from ours, once, by 
imposing redistribution and production of an homogeneous good, we 
discard – unlike them – any implicit terms-of-trade effect.) 
If it is the uncovered sector tax that rises: 
 






(W2+T2) - W2 L
2
(W2+T2)'] < 0 (37) 
L1/T2 = 0   ;   L2/T2  =  L
2









(W2+T2) - W2 L
2
(W2+T2)']  <  0 
 
U/T2  =  - L2/T2 > 0       (39) 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T2 =         (40) 
=  W
1
(L1) L1(T1, T2)/T2  +  W
2
(L2) L2(T1, T2)/T2  = 
=  W
2














(W2+T2) - W2 L
2
(W2+T2)']  <  0 
 
The welfare change of a rise in T2 will be negative. 








(W2+T)]  =  W2 L
_
 - W2 L
2
(W2+T)   (41) 
W2 / T  =  [W1 L
1
(W1+T)' + W2 L
2





(W2 + T) - W2 L
2
(W2 + T)']  <  0 
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L1/T  =  L
1
(W1 + T)'  <  0       (43) 






(W2 + T) + W1 L
1





(W2 + T) - W2 L
2
(W2 + T)']  
L2/T  < 0 iff  | 
1




(W1 + T)' (W1 
+ T) / L
1
(W1 + T). 








(W2 + T)] +    (44) 
{L
1
(W1 + T)' L
2







(W2+T)'] (> 0 if but not only if W1 is close to W2) 
 
We can assess the induced welfare change after a tax movement by: 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T =         (45) 
=  W
1
(L1) L1(T1, T2)/T  +  W
2













(W2 + T) + W1 L
1
(W1 





(W2 + T) - W2 L
2




(W1 + T)' is negligible, the effect will be negative. 
 
Proposition 3: 3.1. Consider a dualistic model with no mobility. The 
equilibrium after-tax wage in the second sector may be higher or lower 
than the free market equilibrium, in which there will be unemployment in 
the institutional sector or urban region. 
3.2. An unilateral increase in the tax rate of the institutionally covered 
sector will depress the wage of the other sector, which will see its 
employment increase. Total unemployment will likely increase. 
3.3. An increase in the tax rate of the uncovered sector will decrease its 
employment - and local population - and increase total unemployment by 
the same amount. 
3.4. Under a uniform fiscal system, an increase of the (common) tax rate 
will relocate the labor force, increasing (decreasing) employment in the 
uncovered sector if the elasticity of demand of the covered sector is high 
(low) - higher (lower) than the ratio between the gross wage of the covered 
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sector and the after-tax wage of the uncovered one. Total unemployment 
will likely increase. 
3.5. In general, a raise in a tax rate will be welfare detracting. 
 
6. Multiple or global coverage under imperfect 
mobility - The Bhagwati-Hamada Model 
Assume 3.b, 4.b. and 5.b. of section I. The wage in both sectors are fixed 
at level’s Wi, i =1,2. One can see this same (technically speaking) scenario 
in, for example, Bhagwati & Hamada (1974).  
Then, local employment, being demand determined: 
 
Li =  L
i
(Wi + Ti)       (46) 
 




i - Li       (47) 
 
Denote by ui the unemployment rate in sector/region i. Define: 
 
ui = Ui / L
_
i = 1 - Li / L
_
i         (48) 
 
The equilibrium condition will establish equalization of expected 
income in both sectors: 
 
 (1 - u1) W1 = (1 - u2) W2        (49) 
 




(W1 + T1) / L
_
1 = W2 L
2
(W2 + T2) / L
_
2     (50) 
 
In equilibrium, the average net wage in the economy, [W1 L
1







 + [W2 L
2






, is equal to the expected wage in 





One can re-write condition (50) as: 
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1)  =  W2 L
2
(W2 + T2) L
_
1    (51) 
L
_
i/Ti  =  - L
_




(Wi + Ti)’ /      (52) 
/ [W1 L
1
(W1 + T1) + W2 L
2




(Wj + Tj) is fixed, this also implies that equilibrium expected 
after-tax wage W2 L
2
(W2 + T2) / L
_
2 = W1 L
1
(W1 + T1) / L
_
1 will decrease 
with Ti. As both Wi’s are fixed, the local unemployment rate in both 
regions will always increase with either Ti. 
 
Welfare Change per unit of Ti =         (53) 
=  W
i
(Li) Li(T1, T2)/Ti  =  (Wi + Ti)  L
i
(Wi + Ti)’  <  0 
 
This would be the standard effect of a raise in taxes (as of the 
institutional wage) in a unionised single-sector economy that has inelastic 
supply. Wi + Ti = W
i
(Li) and (expected to) equals the value of marginal 
product of labor P f
i
’(Li) 
4 , where f
i
(Li) denotes the local production 
function of region i. On the other hand, L
i




Welfare Change per unit of Ti  =  (Wi + Ti) / W
i





(Li)’  =   
=  [P f
i
’(Li)] / [P f
i




”(Li)   
 
The welfare loss will be larger the less concave is the local production 
function – the less negative f
i
”(Li). For small tax changes, it will decrease 








’(Li) is the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion – of concavity embedded in 
a function f
i
(Li). It is (here) equal to the inverse of the absolute value of the 
 
4 Implicitly, we could fix P = 1, once the only good in the economy is income or product. 
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(Wi + Ti)’ |. 
Consider an uniform tax system. Then: 
W1 L
1




1)  =  W2 L
2
(W2 + T) L
_




i/T  =  - L
_








(Wj + T)’] /   (56) 
/ [W1 L
1
(W1 + T) + W2 L
2
(W2 + T)] < 0 
 
After an increase in the tax rate, there will be an inflow of population to 










(Wj + T)’     (57) 
or  - L
i
(Wi + T)’ / L
i
(Wi + T)  <  - L
j
(Wj + T)’ / L
j
(Wj + T)   
 
There will be an inflow of population to the region of lower (absolute) 
semi-elasticity of labor demand. 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T  =        (58) 
=  (W1 + T) L
1
(W1 + T)’  +  (W2 + T) L
2
(W2 + T)’  < 0  
 
Proposition 4: 4.1. With multiple coverage, the increase in a or both tax 
rates will increase total unemployment and both local unemployment rates. 
4.2. An unilateral increase in the tax rate of one of the regions will 
generate an outflow of migrants to the other region, where the 
unemployment rate will (also) rise. 
4.3. Under a uniform fiscal system, an increase of the (common) tax rate 
will relocate the labor force, increasing (decreasing) residence in the sector 
of lower absolute value of the semi-elasticity of labor demand. 
4.4. The increase in taxes will always generate welfare losses – 
proportional to the gross wage and to the slope of the demand of the sector 
where the tax rate rises, decreasing with the concavity of the underlying 
production function - increasing with the absolute size of the inverse semi-
elasticity of local labor demand. 
 
 
5 The term “inverse” may not be appropriate. The concept measures the change in labor 
demand (and employment) induced per unitary proportional increase of the gross wage 
rate. 
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7. Size restrictions in the sectors 
In this section we want to quantify the effects of several changes in the 
two-sector model with institutional wage fixed in sector 1 but with size 
restriction in the areas. These could reproduce regional congestion, but not 
necessarily national boundaries. They are expected to independentize tax 
effects across regions. 
We always assume 3.b. and 4.b. of section I. We distinguish two cases: 
Model A: 
Region 1 has a limited housing capacity, or there are barriers to 
membership or affiliation in region 1 (say, "insiders" limit entry). We add 
assumption: 
5.c. Wage in the second sector is market determined and entry location 




 on the amount of people 
that can actually live there. 
 
If the restriction is binding in equilibrium, supply in the second sector 




2  =  L
_




        (59) 
 










) - T2         (60) 
 




 is smaller than the equilibrium local supply in 
the institutional sector generated in the Harris-Todaro framework. As long 
as that condition holds, dynamics of this scenario have some of the same 
properties of the partial coverage - perfect mobility case. 
It is straightforward to show that the tax on the uncovered sector has no 
allocation effects and implies no welfare loss: 
 
W2/T2  =  - 1   ;    L2/T2  =  0      (61) 
 
The impact of the tax on region 1 is totally reflected in local 
(un)employment: 
 
L1/T1  =  L
1
(W1 + T1)’       (62) 
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A uniform tax will hurt only – and according to (62) – sector 1’s 
employment. The welfare loss of an increase in the tax on the covered 
sector always results in: 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T1 (or T)  =       (63) 
=  (W1 + T1)  L
1
(W1 + T1)’  <  0 
 
Proposition 5: 5.1. In a dualistic model with housing or membership 
restrictions and institutional wage fixed in one of the sectors, the 
equilibrium after-tax wage in the uncovered sector is higher than for the 
perfect mobility case. There will be unemployment but less than in the H.-
T. framework. 
5.2. Given the mobility barrier, an increase of a tax rate will have mainly 
local effects: no effect for the employment of the uncovered sector; a 
reduction in the covered sector employment, of local and total welfare 
when its tax rate rises. 
Model B:  
The traditional sector has a limited ability of employment generation, 
say land (and land productivity) is fixed or limited; or there are 
employment quotas in the region. We consider assumption: 
5.d. Wage in second sector is demand determined but there is a(n 
exogenous) limit of access to employment in the sector given by L2
*
. 




  =  L
2




) – T2     (64) 
 
If employment in sector 2 is fixed, equilibrium is guaranteed by 




(W1 + T1) / L
_






) - T2] / L
_
2    (65) 
 
We will have the same type of scenario as in B.-H. – unemployment in 
both sectors. However, the fiscal implications differ. 
As employment is fixed – rationed - in sector 2, any change in the local 
tax is totally absorbed by falls in net wages: 
 
W2/T2  =  - 1   ;    L2/T2  =  0      (66) 
 
Population will flow to region 1 where local unemployment increases. 
L
_
1/T2  =  - L
_




 / [W1 L
1
(W1 + T1) + W2 L2
*
]  >  0  (67) 
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1/T1  =  - L
_




(W1 + T1)’ /     (68) 
/ [W1 L
1
(W1 + T1) + W2 L2
*
] < 0 
 
Welfare Change per unit of T1 (or T)  =       (69) 
=  (W1 + T1)  L
1
(W1 + T1)’  < 0  
 




(W1 + T) / L
_






) - T] / L
_
2     (70) 
 




1/T  =  - L
_




 + W1 L
1
(W1 + T)’ L
_
2] /    (71) 
/ [W1 L
1










(W1+T) = | 
1
 | < (W1+T) / W2  (72) 
 
Proposition 6: With a employment-congested sector, we arrive at 
equilibrium conditions similar to B.H. structure – but not to the same 
conclusions about the response to fiscal changes. 
6.1. An unilateral increase in the tax rate of the institutionally covered 
sector will depress its – and total – employment, local and total welfare, 
generating an outflow of population to the congested sector.  
6.2. An increase in the tax rate of the congested sector will have no 
impact on employment or welfare but will imply an outflow of population 
from the congested sector, where after-tax wages fall. 
6.3. Under a uniform fiscal system, an increase of the (common) tax rate 
will relocate the labor force, increasing (decreasing) residence in the 
congested sector if the elasticity of demand of the covered sector is high 
(low) - higher (lower) than the ratio between the gross wage of the covered 
sector and the after-tax wage of the congested one. Total unemployment 
will increase – by the amount that employment in the covered sector 
decreases. Welfare decreases. 
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8. Summary and conclusions 
In the presence of competitive labor markets and perfect mobility across 
regions – or sectors -, uniform taxation offers first-best allocations. 
Moreover, as we always assume redistribution and inelastic total factor 
supply, uniform taxation under such circumstances implies no deadweight 
loss, being completely “neutral”. Such result (even if not neutrality) – 
frequently encountered in the public finance literature 6 – was found to fall 
when the first condition fails, whether the second holds or not. 
On the one hand, it was demonstrated that a unit tax on a minimum 
wage covered / unionised sector may be total welfare improving if the 
region communicates with an uncovered sector one. In general, the 
possibility requires differential taxation, heavier on the uncovered than on 
the covered sector. 
On the other, with less than perfect mobility – hence with some 
unemployment in the economy – taxing the uncovered sector will more 
likely be detrimental to total welfare. 
With two covered sectors, the welfare loss due to taxation is 
(approximately) inversely related to the concavity of the underlying 
production technology of the sector where the tax is levied – directly 
related to the (absolute) magnitude of the inverse semi-elasticity of the 
sector’s labor demand.  
The population outflow predictions after a unilateral increase in one of 
the tax rates were the expected ones for all scenarios: away from the 
increasingly taxed location. Interestingly, whenever a uniform tax system is 
required, an increase in the common tax rate under imperfect mobility will 
shift the labor force to the (un)covered sector if the wage-regulated demand 
elasticity is (high) low in absolute value; if both sectors are covered, to the 
region of lower (absolute) semi-elasticity of labor demand. 
Under sector/region size or affiliation restrictions, mobility across 
regions is somehow lost. Then, an uncovered sector is always cushioned 
from fiscal welfare losses. A covered sector will always experience them 













6 For head taxes, in Mieszkowski & Zodrow (1989); in Gordon (1983), p.583, appraising 
taxation of a mobile commodity such as capital. 
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